As
dawn broke on the morning of November 6, Averell was busily arranging
his units for battle. Averell first sent out three infantry companies
to probe the Confederate position. The skirmishing attack proved the position
to be too strong to make a frontal attack practical, whereupon Averell
decided to send a detachment far to the west to outflank the Confederates
and to fall upon their left. While this flanking movement was in progress,
Averell sent other units and artillery to move against the right and center
to divert the attention of the Confederates.
Averell assigned the flanking movement to a veteran of campaigns in West
Virginia who had proved his abilities in many similar operations, Colonel
Augustus Moor, commander of the Twenty-Eighth Ohio Infantry. Moor was
supported by the Tenth West Virginia and Captain Julius Jaehae's company
of the Fourteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry. Leaving camp abobut nine that
morning, Moor led his company some four miles in a northwesterly direction
with the aid of a local guide. He then turned due south for about an hour,
having marched some nine miles in a semicircle to a point near the Confederate
left without having been detected. Shortly after noon his advance contacted
Confederate skirmishers. Guided by the sounds of gunfire at the Confederate
camp, Moor continued to advance upon the left flank.
Meanwhile, Averell directed units to move against the Confederate right
and center. Colonel Schoonmaker led the Fourteenth and Keeper's battery
against the Confederate right. Driving the Confederate skirmishers before
him, Schoonmaker placed his artillery in position about two-thirds of
a mile from the lines. The battle was joined about eleven o'clock that
morning when the Confederate artillery opened up on Schoonmaker's battery,
which directed its fire toward the Confederate center.
Schoonmaker's artillery fire fell among the horses and Confederate batteries.
Jackson, Lurty, and one piece of Chapman's battery returned the fire in
this duel which lasted about a half hour. Directed some 500 feet below
them, the Confederate fire was accurate and forced the Federal artillery
to withdraw. The Confederate artillery continued to shell the Federal
infantry and cavalry whenever a target was exposed. Fearing that the Confederates,
if not pressed continuously, would detect Moor's flanking movement, Schoonmaker
moved his artillery from the right toward the center of the line. He managed
to fire several telling rounds before he was again forced to change position
by the heavy Confederate artillery fire. About one o'clock the three pieces
of Federal artillery firing upon the Confederate center were again forced
to withdraw by Jackson's battery and Chapman's rifled piece. In the meantime
two artillery pieces were advanced up the road and opened up on the Twenty-Second
Virginia to the left of Chapman, only to be silenced and driven away by
Chapman's and Lurty's batteries.
About 1:45 General Averell decided, by the sounds of heavy fighting on
the left flank, that Colonel Moor had engaged the Confederates and that
the time for the frontal assault was at hand. Averell then ordered the
attack to commence upon the center. Leaving one company of the second
to guard the horses of the mounted infantry, the Second, Third, and Eighth
West Virginia regiments attacked. After an hour of hard fighting, exposed
at times to the Confederate artillery, the three regiments moved up the
mountain and gained a position within fifty yards of the line in front
of the Confederate center and batteries. The Confederates repulsed the
first charge and the Federals fell back to regroup for a renewed assault.
In the meantime the Confederate commander had weakened the center to reinforce
the left flank which was wavering and threatened to collapse.
On the left flank the Confederates were sheltered by timber while the
Federals advanced in line of battle through heavy undergrowth. Colonel
Thompson was vainly struggling to resist the overwhelming numbers of Federals
under Colonel Moor with the Twenty-Eighth and the Tenth West Virginia.
To prevent being outflanked, which was constantly attempted, Thompson
had extended his line much farther than his strength would warrant.
Colonel Moor's advance skirmishers had been joined by three companies
of the Twenty-Eighth when they arrived in front of Thompson's position
and were confronted by a hedge constructed of logs and brush. The Twenty-Eighth
moved forward in line of battle as Colonel Harris brought up the Tenth
West Virginia just in time. Trees and undergrowth limited their view to
about twenty-five or thirty yards and the Confederates allowed them to
approach within that distance before opening fire. Rising with a "Rebel"
yell, the Confederates greeted the Twenty-Eighth with a deadly fire and
charged the wavering line. This was the critical moment for the Federals
and Colonel Moor saved the day by ordering his regiment to hit the ground
and fire by file. The sudden disappearance of the regiment and the increased
fire through the underbrush checked the Confederate charge. Having some
difficulty in bringing up his regiment through the cavalry horses and
confusion, Colonel Harris arrived just in time to hold the line. The Tenth
took a positon on the right of the Twenty-Eighth as the assault was renewed.
Erroneously informed that the Federals were trying to gain the rear by
a more circuitous route than actually taken by Moor, Colonel Thompson
had moved far to the extreme left. When the firing began, Thompson realized
his error and returned quickly to reinforce Captain Marshall. It was at
this point that the Confederates charged and drove the Federal skirmishers
back to their main body. Thompson then sent a request for reinforcements
to Colonel Jackson at the center. The Union troops pushed the Confederates
back and forced their line to give way gradually. Quite a number of the
Confederates were unnerved by the overwhilming odds, and knowing the importance
of holding this flank, Thompson repeatedly tried to rally his troops.
The Confederates stubbornly defended the left flank against the heavy
force of Federals and made several desperate attempts to break the strength
of the drive, fully aware that the loss of this flank meant the loss of
the battle. As often as they took a stand, the Confederates were driven
back until Thompson was reinforced by companies A, E, and I of the Twenty-Second
Virginia and an additional company of dismounted Fourteenth Cavalry. Realizing
their advantage in numbers, the Federals pressed vigorously against the
wavering line. Thompson deployed the two companies of the Fourteenth to
the left of his line where the Federals were making their strongest assault.
Although General Echols was aware that the center and right were heavily
engaged, he knew that he must reinforce the left flank to prevent being
encircled. He ordered Major Blessing to move his Twenty-Third Battalion
from the center to the left flank. With six companies, numbering about
300 men, Blessing deployed his troops to the right of Captain Marshall
and led his battalion in a charge, driving the Federals back before he
was checked by a heavy volley of musketry. The Confederates were then
forced back to fence running parallel to the lines which they held for
a short while.
Within 300 yeards of the turnpike, Thompson was facing the Union lines
some 20 yards away. He failed to rally the Twenty-Third Battalion and
detachments of the Fourteenth which were giving way in some confusion.
Echols observed the renewed assault on his center and right as the left
was falling back; at this time the fighting was heavy along the entire
line. As a last measure Echols sent Colonel Patton with the remainder
of the Twentieth to support Thompson, but Patton soon informed Echols
that the Confederates were hopelessly outnumbered and that the left flank
was on the verge of collapse.
At the same time the Second, Third, and Eighth West Virginia pressed
toward the center to join the left segment of Colonel Moor's detachment
of some 1,175 men. At the time the Federals on the right were not pressing,
and Echols went to the center to help Jackson rally the men to resist
the attacking infantry. At Jackson's suggestion the artillery began to
move to the rear. The center held for a half-hour longer when Echols ordered
the Confederates to fall back because the left was giving way. Jackson
remained at the center until the last two artillery pieces were withdrawn.
Major McLaughlin prehaps prevented the capture of Echols' entire command
by keeping the artillery in action which checked the federal advance until
the troops withdrew.
The left flank finally gave way completely to Moor's repeared charges.
Detailing one company of the Twenty-Eighth and one of the Tenth to march
in the rear as a small reserve and to guard his flanks, Moor ordered the
final Federal charge against the left flank. With cheers completely drowning
out the Rebel yells, the Union infantry pressed forward until the left
was forced back to the hill where the Confederate artillery was stationed.
The artillery had just begun to withdraw, and at this time, the Eighth
joined Moor's left. Then a wild scene ensued -- the Union troops maintained
a constant fire into the retreating Confederates, killing and wounding
artillery horses, while Confederate officers vainly urged their men to
make another stand. Confederate infantrymen were dispersed by their own
cavalry as the officers drove cannon and caissons through the confused
ranks.
Within a few minutes the Confederates had faded from sight into the woods
south of the turnpike. When Moor's right wing came up to the pike, no
Confederates remained but the dead and wounded. Farther up the pike a
part of Moor's detachment fired at two rapidly moving spring wagons and
killed both horses. They captured the wagons and found them loaded with
wounded Confederates. As Averell arrived the Twenty-Eighth was ordered
to pursue the Confederates.
The sudden collapse of the confederates lines, accompanied by heavy Federal
artillery shelling and strong infantry charges made an orderly retreat
almost impossible. The Twenty-Sixth, guarding the Locust Creek Road, was
cut off by Averell's rapid movements, but they later rejoined the main
body. Echols withdrawaal from the position at Droop Mountain, begun about
four o'clock that afternoon, saved his command from Averell's trap.
Averell arrived at the camp just as the Confederates were withdrawing.
Assigning details to care for the wounded and dead, Averell brought up
the horses of the dismounted cavalry. Gibson's Battalion, Ewing's Battery,
the Second, Third, and Eighth West Virginia, with the Fourteenth Pennsylvania
pursued the Confederates some seven or eight miles until they were halted
by the darkness. Federal cavalry continued to harass the Confederate rearguard,
to be checked temporarily on one occasion by a Confederate countercharge.
Soon after his escape from Droop Mountain, Echols learned of a greater
and perhaps more dangerous trap confronting him. From Meadow Bluff a messenger
informed him of the Federal column under General Duffie, estimated to
be over 2,000 strong, which was rapidly advancing toward Lewisburg. The
Confederates at Droop Mountain numbered about 2,000 men, while Echols
estimated Averell's strengtht at about 7,000.
Still some 28 miles from Lewisburg, Averell hoped to keep the Confederates
from returning there to quickly. If the Confederates moved too slowly,
Echols might be trapped by Duffie who was scheduled to arrive in Lewisburg
the following day. Descending the mountain the following morning. Averell's
hopes were boosted by the sight of several camp fires to the east which
indicated that the Confederates were somewhat dispersed. If they took
time to regroup before continuing southward, the best-laid plans might
be realized.